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Abstract: The aim of my paper is to investigate Gorgias’ argument 
against motion, which is found in his Peri tou mē ontos and preserved 
only in MXG 980a1˗8. I tried to shed new light both on this specific 
reflection and on the reliability of Pseudo-Aristotle’s version. By 
exploring the so called “change argument” and the “argument from 
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divisibility”, I focused on the particular strategy used by the Sophist 
in his synthetikē apodeixis, which should be investigated in relation 
to the dispute between monistic and pluralistic ontology. In this 
regard, the puzzle from “divisibility everywhere” and its connection 
with the void as not-being can provide new elements to grasp the 
philosophical background in which the Sophist moves. On the one 
hand, Gorgias’ argument against motion is part of a broader dispute 
on the divisibility/indivisibility of being; on the other, his original 
elaboration of this puzzle seems to be perfectly understandable within 
the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent with the 
argumentative style of the Sophist. 
Keywords: Gorgias, Eleatism, Atomism, Motion, Divisibility. 
 
 
We all have reasons 
For moving. 
I move 
To keep things whole 
(Mark Strand) 
Brief review of the two PTMO versions  
The Peri tou me ontos (PTMO) of Gorgias has been preserved by two 
different versions: Sextus Empiricus (M. 7.65-87> 82B 3 DK> D26b 
LM) and the pseudo-Aristotelian Anonymous (MXG 979a12-
980b21> D26a LM> ≠ DK). The question of which of the two 
versions is more reliable has been highly debated, and for the most 
part the Anonymous has been preferred as more trustworthy. My aim 
is to focus not on this specific subject, which I have dealt with in the 
past, but to investigate Gorgias’ reflection upon motion, which is 
found only in MXG. 
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Apart from some slight differences between the two versions, the 
summary statement of the three theses may be put as follows: 
“Gorgias says that nothing is; and if [scil. something] is, it is 
unknowable, and if [scil. something] both is and is knowable, it 
cannot be indicated to other people” (MXG 979a12-13). The two 
versions differ, however, starting from the strategy adopted in the 
structure of the first thesis, which according to the Anonymous is 
divided into two main arguments: 
1. The protos logos or idios apodeixis is the “proper proof” (MXG 
979a25˗33), in which Gorgias demonstrates that nothing is by 
advancing arguments derived from three different hypothetical 
premises: (a) that what is not is what is not; (b) that what is not is; (c) 
that what is not and what is are identical. Whichever of the three 
premises is accepted, Gorgias concludes that it can neither be nor not 
be. 
2. The deuteros logos or synthetike apodeixis is the “synthetic 
demonstration” (MXG 979b20˗980a8), derived from the 
combination and the refutation of other philosophers’ doctrines 
(especially those of Melissus and Zeno). In its turn, this proof is 
developed into two distinct arguments, the ungenerated/generated 
antinomy and the one/many antinomy, with the addition of an 
argument against motion that will be the subject of my investigation. 
This demonstration also aims at concluding that nothing is. 
No explicit reference to either the proper proof or the synthetic one 
is found in Sextus; here the conclusion that nothing is is reached by 
denying each of the three horns of a trilemma, according to which “if 
[scil. something] is, then it is either what is or what is not, or both 
what is and what is not” (M. 7.66). My suggestion is that in Sextus’ 
version the Gorgianic arguments are forced into a scheme widely 
used by the Skeptic or his source. As a confirmation of a Skeptical 
interference with Gorgias’ text, it should be considered that the 
trilemma with the third horn connecting two contradictories or two 
opposites (proposed also in the argument on generation, M. 7.68), is 
a typical strategy of Aenesidemus, from whom Sextus borrows many 
arguments preserved in this section of M. 7. 
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The hypothesis that the synthetic demonstration could actually be 
invented by the Anonymous (or other philosophers by whom he had 
been inspired) has been generally rejected. In contrast, the Sophist’s 
method based on the antithetical assembly of others’ doxai is 
confirmed by ancient sources: indeed, Gorgias probably influenced 
the tendency, which went on to become widespread in doxography, 
to gather and to combine different doctrines within opposing 
schemes. Furthermore, the Anonymous didn’t have any plausible 
reason to arbitrarily add parts to Gorgias’ treatise: by considering De 
Gorgia, we can maintain that when the Anonymous intervenes, he 
does so explicitly, as happens at the beginning and in the refutation 
of the idios apodeixis (see respectively MXG 979a14-24 and 979a34-
b19). 
Drawing different arguments from his opponents who argue in favor 
of the same thesis, the Sophist combines and mutually contrasts their 
doctrines; moreover, their connection will bring to light and finally 
delegitimize their shared assumption. It is sometimes maintained that 
Gorgias is exclusively contrasting arguments within Eleatic 
philosophy, whose internal contradictions would be traced and faced 
by his strategy: evidence in support of this claim would be the fact 
that the only philosophers explicitly mentioned by the Anonymous 
are Melissus and Zeno. However, despite this, the synthetike 
apodeixis should also be investigated in relation to the dispute 
between Eleatism and anti-Eleatism. For Gorgias’ methodology aims 
to connect the different doxai into two main and opposing groups 
based on the ungenerated/generated and one/many antitheses, which 
were so widely discussed in the Presocratic philosophy, especially 
between Eleatics and Atomists. In order to reach his ‘deconstructive’ 
end, Gorgias chiefly exploits the arguments of Melissus and Zeno, 
led by a prevalent, but not exclusively, anti-Eleatic task: for once 
unity and eternity are refuted, he concludes neither that being is many 
nor that it is generated, but – more radically – that nothing is. 
The arguments in MXG attributed to Melissus and Zeno are often 
intertwined and not easily distinguishable. This is not a result, 
however, of a confused analysis by the Sophist; on the contrary, 
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Gorgias must have been very careful in choosing the topics and in 
adopting the best strategy to make his assertions more effective. On 
the whole, the apagogical argument, which he widely uses, derives 
from Zeno; and yet Gorgias disproves a thesis not just by showing 
that it would inevitably lead to contrary or contradictory conclusions, 
but by inserting it in a more complex process, where arguments 
originally employed for an opposite purpose clash with one another 
(for example, Zeno’s arguments against multiplicity end up being 
used against Melissus’ one). Whereas the dialectical strategy is 
Zenonian, the overall inspiration of the synthetike apodeixis seems to 
be primarily anti-Melissean: for Gorgias recovers, and even 
radicalizes, Eleatic suggestions, though used with an anti-Eleatic 
purpose. On the one hand, the lack of Melissus’ and Zeno’s names in 
Sextus’ version invites us to think that they were not made explicit in 
the original treatise; on the other, their arguments must have been 
well recognizable to shrewd readers or listeners. We can then assume 
that the Anonymous, even if it is the case that he added the names of 
the two Eleatics himself, does not force or manipulate the arguments, 
but limits himself to clarifying the philosophical origin of some of 
the Sophist’s claims. 
First antinomy: either ungenerated or 
generated 
In spite of some evident stylistic differences, the two versions offer a 
rather similar reasoning against being ungenerated and generated. 
However, in contrast with the Anonymous, Sextus proposes a 
trilemma with the third horn composed by two opposites, namely, 
eternal and generated at the same time (M. 7.72). The MXG version, 
which I follow as more reliable, introduces the widely discussed 
ungenerated/generated dilemma as follows: 
μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φησίν· εἰ δὲ ἔστιν, ἤτοι 
ἀγέννητον ἢ γενόμενον εἶναι. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγένητον, 
ἄπειρον αὐτὸ τοῖς τοῦ Μελίσσου ἀξιώμασι λαμβάνει· 
6 Rev. Archai (ISSN: 1984-249X), n. 31, Brasília, 2021, e03128. 
 
τὸ δ' ἄπειρον οὐκ ἂν εἶναί που.1 οὔτε γὰρ ἐν αὑτῷ οὔτ' 
ἂν ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι· δύο γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἢ πλείω εἶναι, τό 
τε ἐνὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν ᾧ, μηδαμοῦ δὲ ὂν οὐδὲ εἶναι κατὰ 
τὸν Ζήνωνος λόγον περὶ τῆς χώρας. 
After this argument he says: if [scil. something] is, it 
is either ungenerated or generated. And if it is 
ungenerated, he accepts by Melissus’ axioms that it is 
unlimited. But the unlimited could not be 
anywhere.2For it is neither in itself nor in something 
else: for in this way they would be two or more [scil. 
unlimiteds], the one within and the one within which. 
But nothing is that would be nowhere, according to 
Zeno’s argument about place.  
(MXG 979b20-25> D26a LM, transl. Laks-Most, 
adapted) 
The influence of arguments drawn from Melissus is evident, starting 
from the assumption that what is ungenerated (and therefore eternal) 
is infinite, and what is infinite must be one. First of all, Melissus 
supports the eternity of being (30B1 DK> D2 LM), that is, its lack of 
beginning and end; then, he deduces the infinity from the eternity 
(30B2-4 DK> D3-5 LM). Finally, if what is is unlimited, it must be 
one: “for if it were two, it could not be unlimited, but they would 
limit each other” (30B6 DK> D6 LM). Being, as infinite, cannot be 
delimited by anything.3 
The dismissal of plurality is inferred from the infinity as essential 
feature of being: for two (or more) unlimiteds would find a limit in 
each other and would no longer be infinite. The same argument is 
 
1 που Foss : ποτε mss. 
2 Because of its consistency with the following part of the argument and its analogy 
with M. 7.69, I accept the correction of Foss που instead of the manuscript version 
ποτε, preferred by Laks-Most (2016) who translate “the unlimited could not ever 
be”. Cf. Arist. Phys. IV 1, 209a23 (ἔτι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς εἰ ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, ποὺ ἔσται): 
it is controversial whether the adverb in this Aristotelian passage should be 
understood as indefinite ποὺ according to the mss. reading, or ποῦ according to 
Ross’ proposal. See also note 12. 
3 The same sequence of attributes of being is preserved in 30B7[1] DK> D10 LM 
οὕτως οὖν ἀίδιόν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ ἓν καὶ ὅμοιον πᾶν […]. 
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preserved also in MXG, but while in Melissus the puzzle of the two 
infinites is aimed at demonstrating the unity of being, in Gorgias it 
leads to the conclusion that nothing is. After admitting that infinity, 
as such, is nowhere, the Sophist resorts to Zeno’s assumption that 
what is nowhere is not (MXG 979b25): although no such Zenonian 
argument has been explicitly handed down, we can suppose it was 
one of the conclusions of the motion puzzle according to which “what 
is moved does not move either in the place in which it is nor in the 
one in which it is not” (29B4 DK> D17 LM). But what is nowhere is 
not, as Zeno would probably have concluded. Finally, we don’t know 
much about the Zenonian argument about place: according to 
Aristotle’s testimony, Zeno maintains that whatever exists must be in 
a place, and the place itself, if it is considered one of the existing 
things, must be in a place, and that place in a further place, and so on 
and so forth. Therefore, place does not exist.4 
By contrast, in Sextus (M. 7.69-70) the Melissean aporia of the 
infinite either in itself or in something else is developed by means of 
the distinction between containing and content, place and body, 
according to a topic highly discussed in many sections of Sextus’ 
work but not in the surviving Eleatic fragments, at least in this form. 
In fact, for Sextus the first horn of the dilemma (the infinite contained 
in something other than itself) does not imply two infinites that limit 
each other (as in Melissus and Gorgias, MXG version), but a greater 
infinite which is the container and a lesser one which is the content. 
In the second horn the infinite contained in itself is introduced as a 
logical absurdity since it would be double, namely, place and body at 
the same time. If the argumentative core of M. 7 as a whole is 
authentic, the contrast between τόπος and σῶμα is both linguistically 
 
4 See Arist. Phys. IV 1, 209a23-26> 29A24 DK> D13a LM (cf. Simpl. in Phys. 
562.3-6> D13b LM). On this regard, see Sedley, 2017, p. 23-4, and his 
investigation about Eudemus’ reading of Zeno as a nihilist (cf. Simpl. in Phys. 
563.17-20). 
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and theoretically ascribable to Sextus, who dedicates the second book 
of his Against the Physicists to the relationship between the two.5 
The second element of the antithesis, the argument against being 
generated, is transmitted by a dilemma in both versions: 
γενέσθαι γοῦν οὐδὲν ἂν οὔτ' ἐξ ὄντος οὔτ' ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. 
εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὂν μεταπέσοι, οὐκ ἂν ἔτ' εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ 
γ' εἰ καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν γένοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι εἴη μὴ ὄν. οὐδὲ 
μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ <μὴ> ὄντος6 ἂν γενέσθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μή 
ἐστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκ μηδενὸς ἂν γενέσθαι· εἰ δ' 
ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, δι' ἅπερ οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος, διὰ ταῦτα 
οὐδ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γενέσθαι. εἰ οὖν ἀνάγκη μέν, 
εἴπερ ἔστι τι, ἤτοι ἀγέννητον εἶναι ἢ γενόμενον, ταῦτα 
δὲ ἀδύνατόν τι καὶ εἶναι. 
For nothing could come to be either out of what is or 
out of what is not. For if what is changed, it would no 
longer be what is, just as, if what is not came to be, it 
would no longer be something that is not. Nor 
certainly could it come to be from what is <not>.7 For 
if what is not is not, nothing would come to be from 
nothing. And if what is not is, it could not come to be 
from what is not, for precisely the same reason that it 
does not come to be from what is. 
(MXG 979b27-33> D26a LM, transl. Laks-Most, 
adapted) 
What is cannot be generated from what is because birth is a kind of 
modification and, as such, it involves the transformation of what is 
into what is not, and vice versa. This argument from change, which 
 
5  See, e.g., M. 10.24 (cf. P. 3.126). On M. 7.69 and its similarities with the 
Parmenides of Plato, who could have used Gorgias’ PTMO to refute Eleatic 
doctrines, see Bremond (2019b), who follows Sextus’ version. On the contrary, 
Migliori (1999, p. 112-18) argues in favour of MXG, which would have been used 
by Plato especially in the first part of his Parmenides. 
6 οὐδ' ἐκ <μὴ> ὄντος Foss: οὐδ' ἐξ ὄντος mss. 
7 I follow Foss’ (1828) correction (also accepted by Newiger (1973) and Buchheim 
(1989)), which is justified from a palaeographic viewpoint assuming a drop of μή 
because of haplography. The same Melissean dilemma is preserved also in Sextus, 
M. 7.71. Laks-Most (2016) prefer instead the lectio of manuscripts and translate 
“and certainly it could not come to be from what is either”.  
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is not preserved in Sextus, evidently echoes Melissus, as confirmed 
by the verb μεταπίπτειν, which is rare in itself but preserved both in 
Melissus (30B8[6] DK> D11 LM) and the Anonymous’ version 
(MXG 979b28). 
The second horn of the dilemma, namely birth from what is not, is 
rejected in MXG by a further dilemma: if what is not is not, it 
obviously cannot generate anything, whereas if what is not is 
conceived as being what is not, it is in some way (as stated in the 
idios apodeixis, MXG 979a28-29), so that it cannot generate anything 
for the same reasons why nothing can be generated from what is.8 
Second antinomy: either one or many 
Despite the severely corrupted text in MXG, we can reasonably trace 
Eleatic strands in Gorgias’ argument against unity. In the 
Anonymous’ version, which I emended in my 2010 edition, I tried to 
restore the meaning ad probabilem sententiam of this lacunose text9: 
ἔτι εἴπερ ἔστιν, ἓν ἢ πλείω, φησίν, ἐστίν· εἴτε μήτε ἓν 
μήτε πολλά, οὐδὲν ἂν εἴη. καὶ ἓν μὲν <οὐκ ἂν εἶ>ναι 
ὅτι ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη, τὸ <δ’ ἀσώματον οὐδ>έν <ἐστι, 
μὴ> ἔχον μέγε<θος ὡς ἐν> τῷ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγῳ. ἑνὸς 
δὲ <μὴ> ὄντος οὐδ’ ἂν <ὅλως> εἶναι οὐδέν· μὴ <γὰρ 
ὄντος ἑνός>, μηδὲ πολλὰ <ἂν εἴη>. εἰ δὲ μήτε <ἕν, 
φησίν>, μήτε πολλὰ ἔστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν10. 
 
8 Sextus’ dilemma against generation excludes birth from both what is (since what 
is is not generated but already is) and what is not (since what generates something 
must participate in existence), according to an argument undoubtedly inspired by 
Arist. Phys. I 8, 191a27-31. 
9 The text is usually edited as locus deperditus: see Diels, 1900, p. 33; Untersteiner, 
1961, ad loc.; Cassin, 1980, p. 499-503; Buchheim, 1989, p. 46; Laks-Most, 2016, 
p. 223. 
10 I emended the text of MXG 979b36-980a1 according to the version of L (καὶ ἓν 
μὲν [….....] καὶ ὅτι ἀσώματον ἂν εἴη τὸ εν [……...] εν κ [.....] ε ἔχον μέν γε [......] 
τῷ τοῦ Ζήνωνος λόγῳ. ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐδ’ ἂν […...] εἶναι οὐδὲ μη [……..] μήτε 
πολλά [....] εἰ δὲ μήτε [.......] μήτε πολλά ἐστιν, οὐδὲν ἔστιν). I follow Cook Wilson, 
1892e, p. 444ff., who wrote ἀσώματον in the second gap of L, and Apelt, 1888, p. 
10 Rev. Archai (ISSN: 1984-249X), n. 31, Brasília, 2021, e03128. 
 
Again, if something is, he says, it is one or more. But 
if it is neither one nor many, then it would be nothing. 
And it <could not be> one because it would be 
incorporeal, and <what is incorporeal, not> having 
magnitude, <is nothing>, as by Zeno’s argument. But 
if it is <not> one, it must <definitely> be nothing; for, 
if <there is no one>, neither <can> many <be>. But if, 
<as Gorgias says>, it is neither <one> nor many, then 
nothing is. 
(MXG 979b35-980a1> D26a LM, my translation) 
The argument thus restored, which as a whole must correspond to 
Gorgias’ original inspiration, refutes the existence of the one by 
making Melissus’ doctrines collide with Zeno’s. For on the one hand, 
Gorgias appears to assume the Melissean identity between being one 
and being bodyless. Moreover, according to the second part of the 
controversial 30B9 DK what has a body is endowed with thickness 
and parts; but having parts would correspond to being many. 
εἰ μὲν οὖν εἴη, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἓν εἶναι· ἓν δ' ἐὸν δεῖ αὐτὸ 
σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ ἔχοι πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια, καὶ 
οὐκέτι ἓν εἴη. 
If it were something that is, it must be one. But if it is 
one, it must not have a body. And if it had thickness, 
it would have parts, and would no longer be one. 
(Simpl. in Phys. 110.1-2 and 87.6-7> 30B9 DK> D8 
LM)11 
 
191, who wrote μέγεθος in the fourth gap. Specifically, see Ioli, 2010, p. 101-2, 
133-4. 
11 Laks-Most (2016) excluded the last sentence from Melissus D8 as spurious. 
Indeed, the authenticity of this fragment, quoted by Simplicius to confirm the 
Melissean belief in the incorporeal nature of being, is highly controversial (cf. 
Barnes, 1982, p. 178-80; Kirk-Raven-Schofield, 1983, p. 401). Being ἀσώματον 
seems to contradict the claim that what is is spatially unlimited (τὸ μέγεθος 
ἄπειρον, 30B3 DK) and full (πλέων ἐστίν, 30B7 DK). So, it might be supposed that 
Simplicius is drawing from a selection of Eleatic texts, perhaps mistakenly 
attributing to Melissus what is in fact by Zeno. According to Palmer (2003, p. 1-
10), the second sentence could be an exegetical addition by Simplicius. However, 
there need not be a contradiction between being ἀσώματον, that is, without body, 
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On the other hand, the Sophist connects the incorporeal nature of the 
Melissean one with the Zenonian claim that what is sizeless 
(therefore, implicitly, without body and mass) is not (29B1 DK> D5 
LM): consequently, if the one is, by definition, without body and 
magnitude, it is not.12 The one is therefore refuted by an argument 
consistent with Zeno’s puzzles against plurality: according to 
Simplicius, we know that Zeno was the first to say that what has no 
magnitude is not.13 This last assertion was part of Zeno’s reasoning 
aimed at denying the existence of a plurality: for, once plurality is 
conceded, it leads to absurd consequences (see D6 and D7 LM, on 
which infra, p.22). By using a reductio ad absurdum, Zeno 
reasonably ended up saving the existence of the one, whereas Gorgias 
employed the same strategy to disprove the one. 
My task here is not to discuss whether Zeno’s thought is to be read 
in an anti-unitarian or anti-pluralist perspective. The ancients had 
already noticed the point of weakness in his reasoning and realised 
that his arguments against the many could undermine the one too. To 
overcome this drawback, some scholars suggest that he proposed a 
modified and independent version of the Eleatic doctrine, theorising 
a differentiation between unities: 14  on the one hand the absolute 
Parmenidean One, on the other the one as part of a multiplicity, first 
introduced with a dialectical end, then denied in its empirical 
 
and having size or magnitude (μέγεθος). See Mansfeld, 2016, p. 98-103. 
McKirahan (2010, p. 301) points out that “bodies have extension and also limits, 
so something unlimitedly large is not, properly speaking, a body. Nor does it, 
properly speaking, have thickness, because thickness is a measure of the distance 
between a body’s extremities”. 
12 In Sextus’ version, the argument is undoubtedly influenced by Aristotle both 
from a linguistic and a logical point of view. He introduces a quadrilemma 
considered as exhaustive; every horn is then dismissed according to the modus 
tollendo tollens: “if it is one, it is either a [scil. discrete] quantity (ποσόν), or 
continuous (συνεχές), or a magnitude (μέγεθος), or a body (σῶμα), but whichever 
of these it is, it is not one […]. But it is absurd to say that what is is not any of 
these: so, what is is not one”. On this specific argument, see note 27. 
13 Simpl. in Phys. 139.9-15> 29B2 DK> D7 LM. See also Arist. Metaph. Β 4, 
1001b7-13> 29A21 DK> D8 LM. 
14 See Furley, 1974, p. 353-67. 
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existence. Aware of the aporias implicit in the Zenonian denial of the 
one as part of a plurality, Gorgias would have transferred those 
contradictions to the absolute One, using (as he had already done with 
Melissus’ doctrine on being ungenerated) Eleatic arguments with an 
anti-Eleatic purpose. 
Once the existence of the one is denied, in both versions Gorgias very 
briefly refutes the plurality, since it is made up of unities. Still, the 
MXG version introduces a new argument which is perfectly 
consistent with Gorgias’ methodology and can be chiefly – but not 
exclusively – read as an anti-pluralistic attack. 
The argument against motion 
The argument against motion is preserved only in MXG 980a1˗8. 
Some scholars suppose a textual gap corresponding to a presumed 
argument about rest.15 This hypothesis could be supported by the 
comparison with the previous antinomies, according to a typical 
Gorgianic strategy well attested also in that philosophical 
doxography which investigates reality by means of opposites: we can 
consider, for example, Xenophon (Mem. I 1.14-15), where the pairs 
rest/motion, one/many, ungenerated/generated, put side by side, 
remind us of Gorgias’ antinomies.16 
In contrast, many considerations against the hypothesis of a lacuna 
should be taken into account: firstly, there is no mention of the 
supposed opposition at the beginning of the treatise, where the 
Anonymous, introducing Gorgias’ synthetic proof, mentions only the 
antinomies ungenerated/generated, one/many. Secondly, two gaps 
should be granted, one at the beginning, and the other at the end, with 
the final recapitulation and dismissal of both horns, according to the 
 
15 See Gomperz, 1914, p. 20; Nestle, 1922, p. 556; Newiger, 1973, p. 75˗107; 
Sicking, 1976, p. 390; Mansfeld, 1985, p. 245. 
16 According to Mansfeld (1985, p. 246 and 1990, p. 59ff.), the source of Xenophon 
could be Gorgias himself. See also Bandini-Dorion, 2000, p. 62, note 38. Cf. Pl. 
Parm. 139b2-3. 
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usual Gorgianic procedure.17 Not even the οὐδέ, which opens the 
argument on motion allows us to assume that a part relating to rest is 
missing, since the negative conjunction works as a simple paratactic 
link between two traditionally connected arguments, such as that on 
number and that on motion. The reflection upon motion was 
generally treated as part and development of the debate about 
generation-change and multiplicity-divisibility in Eleatic as well as 
in Atomistic thought.18 Finally, it is very likely that, if Sextus had 
faced a rest/motion dilemma, given his favour for symmetries and 
antinomies, he would not have let it slip. Thus, we can reasonably 
suppose that Sextus decided to omit the argument on motion, which 
he could have considered as the unessential development of the 
previous reasoning.19 
It should also be underlined, as an important feature of the 
Anonymous’ methodology, that his style is mostly brachylogical and, 
when he intervenes in Gorgias’ text, he does not generally introduce 
arbitrary additions. Furthermore, as mentioned on p. 2, the 
Anonymous usually makes the nature and reason of his own 
intervention explicit. Therefore, although this overall section of the 
text has some highly corrupted passages, there is no reason to 
consider the argument as unauthentic. Indeed, the reasoning can be 
 
17 As Calogero (1932) suggests, “l’ammissione di lacune è rimedio estremo” (p. 
225), and the same opinion was supported by Apelt (1888) and Diels (1900), who 
corrected the preserved text without supposing lacunae. See also Gigon, 1936, p. 
200˗2 and Di Benedetto, 1955, p. 292˗3. Conversely, according to Sicking (1976, 
p. 390ff.) and Untersteiner (1996, p. 154, n.90), the two versions of PTMO could 
derive from the same incomplete source, lacking in the argument about rest. 
18 By pointing out the thematic and linguistic analogies between MXG 979b28-29 
and 980a1-3, Migliori (1973, p. 42-4) considers the argument on motion as an 
authentic development of the reflection upon generation. The gap between the two 
sections could have been caused by the “difficile gestazione del testo”, with 
brachylogies and omissions that sometimes make the arguments obscure. 
19 A different and persuasive reading is proposed by Bredlow (2016, p. LVII-
LVIII): according to Bredlow, Sextus’ quadrilemma in M. 7.73 would be a 
‘manipulated’ development of Gorgias’ argument against motion, particularly its 
second part on divisibility. Moreover, all this would confirm the hypothesis that 
the Gorgianic argument on motion is not a separate one, but it is connected with 
the reflection on the one and the many. 
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reconstructed and investigated in its main arguments. Here is the text 
of the Anonymous: 
οὐδ' ἂν κινηθῆναί φησιν οὐδέν. εἰ20 γὰρ κινηθείη, [ἢ] 
οὐκ ἂν ἔτ’ εἴη [ἢ] ὡσαύτως ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν <ὂν>21 
οὐκ ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' οὐκ ὂν γεγονὸς εἴη. ἔτι δὲ εἰ κινεῖται22 
καὶ εἰ23 μεταφέρεται οὐ συνεχὲς ὄν, διήρηται <ᾗ δὲ 
διῄρηται>24 τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔστιν25 ταύτῃ· ὥστ’ εἰ26 πάντῃ 
κινεῖται, πάντῃ διῄρηται. εἰ δ’ οὕτως, πάντῃ οὐκ ἔστιν. 
ἐκλιπὲς γὰρ ταύτῃ, φησίν, ᾗ διῄρηται, τοῦ ὄντος, ἀντὶ 
τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι λέγων, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς 
Λευκίππου καλουμένοις λόγοις γέγραπται. 
He says that it could not move either. [A] For if it 
moved, it would no longer be in the same way, but on 
the one hand it would not be, and on the other, what is 
not would have come to be. [B] Moreover, if it moves 
and is transported, not being continuous, it is divided, 
and <where> what is <is divided>, it is not; so that if 
it moves everywhere, it is divided everywhere. But if 
this is so, then it is not at all. For where there is 
division, there is lack of what is – he says “to be 
divided” instead of “void”, as is written in what are 
called the arguments of Leucippus [cf. Atom. D1b].  
(MXG 980a1-8> D26a LM) 
After refuting eternity and generation, unity and plurality, Gorgias 
rejects motion without drawing, at least directly, from the four 
famous puzzles of Zeno handed down by Aristotle (Phys. VI 9, 
239b9-240a1> 29A25-28 DK> D14-19 LM). His argument is 
developed into two main sub-topics. The first one [A], which I call 
the “change argument”, considers motion as change (980a1-3) and is 
deeply indebted to Melissus; the second one [B], which I call the 
 
20 οὐδέν. εἰ Foss: οὐδενί LR 
21 <ὂν> addidit Foss 
22 εἰ (ἢ L) κινεῖται L et vulg.: ἢ κινεῖ ἢ κινεῖται R 
23 εἰ R: ἓν L. In Ioli (2010) I followed the L lectio ἓν (accepted by Calogero, 
Untersteiner and Buchheim), but R seems to me syntactically more plausible.  
24 <ᾗ δὲ διῄρηται> Apelt 
25 οὐκ ἔστιν Foss: οὔτε τι mss. 
26 ὥστ’ εἰ Foss: ὥστε mss. 
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“argument from divisibility”, introduces motion in space (980a3-5) 
and contains, like an appendix, a reference to void as the essential 
condition of locomotion (980a6-8).27 
The “change argument” 
Melissus describes change (whether understood as birth/death or 
locomotion) as the main enemy of being one. The first Gorgianic 
argument against motion (MXG 980a1-3) evidently takes up 
Melissus’ assumptions in favour of being one: 
εἰ γὰρ ἑτεροιοῦται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὁμοῖον εἶναι, 
ἀλλὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ πρόσθεν ἐόν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν 
γίνεσθαι. εἰ τοίνυν τριχὶ μιῆι μυρίοις ἔτεσιν ἑτεροῖον 
γίνοιτο, ὀλεῖται πᾶν ἐν τῶι παντὶ χρόνωι. 
For if it becomes different, it is necessary that what is 
not be similar, but what was before be destroyed, and 
what is not come to be. If then the whole had become 
different by a single hair in the course of thousands of 
years, it would have been destroyed in the whole of 
this time. 
(Simpl. in Phys. 111.22-24> 30B7[2] DK> D10 LM) 
Change, here introduced by the verb ἑτεροιοῦται (similar to the 
μεταπίπτειν of 30B8[6] DK and MXG 979b28, on which above), is 
incompatible with being ὁμοῖον, that is, the homogeneity of what is 
always identical to itself. Melissus deduces all the characteristics of 
 
27 Cf. the Platonic distinction between ἀλλοίωσις and φορά (cf. Pl. Tht. 181d5-6 
and Prm. 138c1-2). Mansfeld (2002, p. 277-81) stresses that in Parmenides and 
Melissus the reflection upon birth/death is closely linked to the criticism against 
the movement, on which it depends (as also confirmed by Aëtius 1.24.1 Diels> 
28A29 DK and 30A12 DK). Simplicius (in Phys. 103.13-104.17 > D20 LM) 
distinguishes two Melissean arguments similar to those by Gorgias: in the first one 
what is is immobile, for the one is always “similar to itself” (ὁμοῖον), that is without 
change, increasing or suffering. In the second one (introduced by “according to 
another mode”, κατ’ ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον, 104.4), what is is immobile because there is 
no void, so it can recede in no way. 
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being from each other in a rigorous counterfactual reasoning.28 Being 
ὁμοῖον is not the object of an explicit demonstration in his surviving 
fragments, but it is given as a necessary assumption: for if the being 
is one, it must definitively be homogeneous since, if it were not so, it 
would be different, and therefore separate, from itself. In conclusion, 
the one would be many (cf. 30B8 DK). Similarly, in the De Melisso 
homogeneity is considered an essential feature of being one. 
πᾶν δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον ὂν <ἓν> εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ δύο ἢ πλέω 
εἴη, πέρατ' ἂν εἶναι ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα. ἓν δὲ ὂν 
ὅμοιον εἶναι πάντη· εἰ γὰρ ἀνόμοιον, πλείω ὄντα οὐκ 
ἂν ἔτι ἓν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πολλά. ἀίδιον δὲ ὂν ἄμετρόν τε 
καὶ ὅμοιον πάντη ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν 
κινηθῆναι μὴ εἴς τι ὑποχωρῆσαν. ὑποχωρῆσαι δὲ 
ἀνάγκην εἶναι ἤτοι εἰς πλῆρες ἰὸν ἢ εἰς κενόν· τούτων 
δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἂν δέξασθαι [τὸ πλῆρες], τὸ δὲ οὐκ εἶναι 
οὐδέν [ἢ τὸ κενόν].  
But being all and unlimited, it is <one>.  For if things 
were two or more, they would limit each other. But if 
it is one, it is in every way similar to itself; for if it 
were dissimilar, then things, being a plurality, would 
be no longer one, but multiple. But if it is eternal, 
immense and everywhere similar, the one is immobile. 
For it could not move without receding into 
something. Now, it is necessary, in order to recede, to 
penetrate either into what is full or what is void. But 
of these two, the one could not receive it while the 
other is nothing. 
(MXG 974a12-14> 30A5 DK> D19 LM) 
In the De Melisso too, the counterfactual reasoning is marked out by 
the following steps: infinity – unity – homogeneity – immobility. 
Since being is full and everywhere equal to itself, it must be immobile 
(the last term of the demonstrative sequence): for there is nothing 
different from its fullness into which to withdraw. Therefore, also the 
Anonymous’ version of the Melissean “change argument” against 
 
28 See Rossetti, 2017a, p. 326-27; Bremond, 2019b, p. 94. 
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motion aims to defend the unity of being, in opposition to the 
pluralists.29 
The sequence of arguments in Gorgias’ proof is very similar to the 
Melissean one, and supports the hypothesis that the main opponent 
inspiring the synthetike apodeixis is Melissus and his Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος 
ἢ Περὶ φύσεως, as reasonably confirmed by the antiphrasis in the title 
of Gorgias’ treatise.30  The adverb ὡσαύτως (MXG 980a2) would 
refer to homogeneity:31 like the Eleatics, Gorgias maintains that if 
being is homogeneous (i.e. completely identical to itself), it must be 
immobile, since motion would involve change, that is a shift from a 
condition (ontological and logical at the same time) to its opposite. 
The identity of what is (or is not) to itself is underlying the whole 
Gorgianic argument: for it is already working in the overall anti-
Eleatic inspiration of the idios apodeixis where if what is is what is 
and what is not is what is not, it can be concluded that being and not 
being are indistinguishable. Gorgias’ reasoning is grounded in the 
complex semantics of the verb εἶναι, which is always shifting from 
copulative to veridical and, finally, existential meaning.32 
It is highly possible that the target of his idios apodeixis is not only 
the Eleatics, but also the Atomists, who maintain that what is (the set 
 
29 Bremonds (2019a, p. 30-31) rejects the Pseudo-Aristotelian argument and argues 
in favour of a temporal meaning of ὁμοῖον, but her reading cannot be discussed 
here in detail. 
30 In its extended form the title Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ Περὶ φύσεως is handed down 
only by Sextus. Olympiodorus (In Gorg. Prooem. 9> 82B2 DK> R23 LM) 
mentions a treatise known as Περὶ φύσεως, which could be an abbreviation of the 
longer title (Maier, 1943, p. 227, n.4), or the authentic title compared to a 
hypothetical addition by Sextus (Burnet, 1914, p. 120, n.1 and, albeit with 
differences, Freeman ,1966, p. 362, Di Benedetto, 1955, p. 290, n.7); but this last 
assumption is today mainly rejected (cf. Schmalzriedt 1970, p. 128; Mansfeld 
1985, n. 16). The long title is sceptically considered by Kirk-Raven-Schofield 
1983, p. 102-3, 391-2, note 1, and Mansfeld, 2016, p. 97-8, while Palmer 2009, p. 
205ff. n. 25 argues in favour of it both in Melissus and Gorgias. 
31 See also Calogero, 1932, p. 230, n.36; Gomperz, 1914, p. 20; Gigon, 1936, p. 
200; Untersteiner, 1961, p. 68, note ad loc. 
32 The Greek verb εἶναι is described by Cassin, 1998, p. 23-4 as “fait de langue 
total”. 
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of atoms) is no more than what is not (the void). A confirmation could 
come precisely from the clause οὐδὲν μᾶλλον used by Atomists in 
order to defend the existence of both atoms and the void, and by 
Gorgias in the opposite sense: “for what is not is something that is 
not, and what is is something that is, so that things are no more than 
they are not”33. To say that “things are no more than they are not” is 
equivalent, for Leucippus, to saying that “everything is”, while for 
Gorgias that “nothing is”. 
The “argument from divisibility” and its 
forebears 
Like Parmenides, Melissus denied that what is is divisible on the 
ground that division is a kind of change (30B7[1-2] DK> D10 LM). 
In Melissus, more precisely, motion derives from divisibility (“for if 
what is is divided, it moves. But if it moved, it would not exist”, 
30B10 DK> D9 LM), while in Gorgias it is divisibility that derives 
from motion (“if it moves and is transported, not being continuous, it 
is divided”, MXG 980a5). Let us focus on the B argument in MXG 
980a3-8: 
T1 
ἔτι δὲ εἰ κινεῖται καὶ εἰ μεταφέρεται οὐ συνεχὲς ὄν, 
διήρηται <ᾗ δὲ διῄρηται> τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔστιν ταύτῃ· ὥστ’ 
εἰ πάντῃ κινεῖται, πάντῃ διῄρηται. εἰ δ’ οὕτως, πάντῃ 
οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐκλιπὲς γὰρ ταύτῃ, φησίν, ᾗ διῄρηται, τοῦ 
 
33 MXG 979a26-27 τό τε γὰρ μὴ ὄν ἐστι μὴ ὄν, καὶ τὸ ὂν ὄν, ὥστε οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ 
εἶναι ἢ οὐκ εἶναι τὰ πράγματα. Cf. 67A6 DK (> D31 LM διὸ καὶ οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ 
ὂν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἶναί φασιν, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ κενὸν <ἔλαττον> τοῦ σώματος), 67A8 
DK (> D32 LM ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὑπάρχειν) and 68B156 DK 
(> D33 LM μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι). I see no decisive reasons for 
expunging MXG 979a27, considered as an interpolation by Kerferd (1955, p. 7-11), 
Mansfeld (1988, p. 258) and Curd (2006, p. 187). Some possible reasons for the 
omission of οὐδὲν μᾶλλον in Sextus are discussed in Ioli (2009, p. 345-7; 2010, p. 
73-6). For Gorgias’ polemic remarks against Atomists see also De Lacy (1972, p. 
595). 
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ὄντος, ἀντὶ τοῦ κενοῦ τὸ διῃρῆσθαι λέγων, καθάπερ ἐν 
τοῖς Λευκίππου καλουμένοις λόγοις γέγραπται. 
Moreover, if it moves and is transported, not being 
continuous, it is divided, and <where> what is <is 
divided>, it is not; so that if it moves everywhere, it is 
divided everywhere. But if this is so, then it is not at 
all. For where there is division, there is lack of what is 
– he says “to be divided” instead of “void”, as is 
written in what are called the arguments of Leucippus. 
The argument, introduced by the adverb ἔτι (MXG 980a3), is 
particularly condensed and develops two assumptions, that of 
divisibility and that of void. The reference to the void conceived as 
lack of being is a sort of explanatory note attributed verbatim (φησίν) 
to Gorgias. Collectively, the argument from divisibility is organized 
into four steps: 
1) If something moves, then it is divided and is no longer 
continuous. 
2) To be divided corresponds to (and is equivalent to) void, that 
is not being. 
3) Thus, in so far as it is divided, equally it is not. 
4) Finally, if it moves everywhere, then it is divided everywhere, 
and so it is nowhere (or it is not at all). 
Our first task is trying to grasp the problematic notion of πάντῃ. As 
McKirahan opportunely pointed out, “everywhere (πάντῃ) divisible 
is different from infinitely divisible.”34 Infinite division is a process 
which always leaves pieces of positive size, and therefore never runs 
out. On the contrary, “everywhere divisible” implies an actual 
division of a body and a further subdivision of each product of the 
previous division up to leaving pieces of no positive size. 
The divisibility of being, as incompatible with its continuity, has been 
decisively countered by Eleatics. The being of Parmenides is in all 
 
34 McKirahan, 2010, p. 310. 
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equal to itself (therefore not divisible) and in all continuous and full 
(therefore immobile): 
οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον· 
οὐδέ τι τῆι μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι,  
οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ' ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος.  
τῶι ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.  
Nor is it divisible, since as a whole it is all alike35, 
Nor at all more here, which would prevent it from 
being continuous36, 
Nor at all less,37 but as a whole it is full of being. 
That is why as a whole it is continuous: for what is is 
adjacent to what is. 
(28B8.22-25 DK> D8 LM, transl. Laks-Most, 
adapted) 
Being συνεχές has been differently interpreted: some argue in favour 
of a temporal continuity,38 others of a spatial continuity,39 and finally 
others defend either an ontological or a logical interpretation. 40 
However, it can be argued that being συνεχές here implies (1) 
homogeneity, understood as being of the same kind, that is being 
alike everywhere, (2) indivisibility, (3) fullness of being. 
Furthermore, if being is full, therefore without qualitative 
 
35 In favour of an adjectival sense for ὁμοῖον (alike, same, equal) see Mourelatos 
(2008, p. 11) and Sedley (2008, p. 322, n. 45). Laks-Most translate “it is similar”. 
36 Laks-Most translate “cohering”. 
37 Laks-Most translate “weaker”. 
38 Owen, 1960, p. 96-7. 
39 Schofield, 1970, p. 134 and Coxon, 2008, p. 325ff. (but he admits also other 
meanings, n. 42). 
40 See, respectively, Tarán (1965, p. 108: “equal intensity of Being always and 
everywhere”), and Coxon (2009, p. 325-6), who maintains that Being is one and 
indivisible “in spite of the plurality of terms predicated of it”. 
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differences, then it will be indivisible: for if something is divisible, 
that suggests it has distinguishable parts which can be separated from 
each other.41 
The Gorgianic argument on motion and divisibility certainly echoes 
Eleatic claims derived both from Parmenides (such as the reference 
to being συνεχές) and Zeno. Although the origin of the argument 
from divisibility everywhere is not explicit, Gorgias could have in 
mind Zeno’s puzzles about motion, particularly that from 
dichotomy42. Zeno’s four puzzles are probably independent from the 
plurality arguments. Anyway, we should not be surprised to see the 
paradoxes against motion so strictly interwoven with those against 
plurality understood as the multiplicity of positions occupied by a 
body through distinct time units43. Motion always implies a plurality 
of places in space and can generate logical absurdities such as that 
the fastest does not reach the slowest or the arrow does not fly while 
flying. It is not my task here to investigate the mathematical 
interpretation of Zenonian paradoxes and particularly the argument 
from dichotomy.44 In fact, in his argument from divisibility Gorgias 
 
41 On this point see Sattler, 2019, p. 49-52. According to Malcolm (1991, p. 92), 
“Parmenides is to be represented not as saying there is no locomotion because there 
is a plenum, but that there is no locomotion because there is no distinguishability 
in plenum”. 
42 Given the distance between A and B, M1 will be the intermediate point, M2 the 
intermediate between M1 and B, M3 the intermediate between M2 and B and so 
on to infinity (29A25 DK> R17 and 18 LM). Therefore, if a body has to cover the 
finite distance between A and B and this distance is composed of an infinite number 
of distances (or spaces), then the finite will be infinite. Consequently, a body can 
never reach B starting from A. 
43 Sedley 2017, p. 5, speaks of motion and multiplicity as “twin issues”. Cerri 
(2018) introducing the concept of “frammentazione spazio-temporale” (p. 88), 
maintains that in Zeno’s view it is plurality, not movement, that implies paradoxical 
conclusions (see the same opinion in Barnes, 2011). In contrast cf. Pulpito, 2018, 
p. 192-3. 
44 On this question see Barnes, 2011, p. 39-48; Zellini, 2016, p. 88-101. Today in 
mathematics the limit of the sum of a sequence which produces a convergent series 
is finite, while the limit of the sum of a sequence which produces a divergent series 
is infinite. There is therefore an arithmetic objection to Zeno’s fallacy for which an 
infinite sequence of finite partitions is supposed to generate an infinite sequence of 
parts. Space and time are relational structures that undoubtedly involved theoretical 
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undoubtedly draws from Zeno’s dichotomy, but even more from his 
famous criticism of plurality. Indeed, Zeno disproves the existence 
of the many since this hypothesis gives rise to incompatible and 
paradoxical consequences. On the one hand, if many things exist, 
they are both limited and unlimited: for, “if they are as numerous as 
they are, they will be limited”; but, at the same time, they are 
unlimited because “between the things that exist there are always 
other things, and then again others between those” (Simpl. in Phys. 
140.28-33> 29B3 DK> D11 LM). On the other hand, if many things 
exist ‒ and are therefore divided, or separated ‒ “it is necessary that 
they be both small and large, so small that they do not have any size, 
and so large that they are unlimited” (Simpl. in Phys. 141.2-8> 29B1 
DK> D6 LM). But according to Zeno, whatever exists must have 
magnitude, bulk, mass: that is, a body (Simpl. in Phys. 141.1-2> 
29B1 DK> D5 LM). Therefore, as seen above, if each of the many 
has no magnitude, it does not exist. In contrast, if each of the many 
has some magnitude, it has parts, and each part will be distinct from 
the other, and so on and so forth; therefore a body having a finite size 
will be infinite because of its infinite divisibility. Then, quoting Zeno 
again, “it is the same thing to say this one time and to say it forever. 
For no part of such a thing will be the last one, nor will there be any 
part of it that will not be in relation with another” (29B1 DK> D6 
LM). 
The Atomists reply to Zeno’s puzzles by defending the existence of 
a multiplicity of atoms, that is, very small and at the same time 
uncuttable bodies, infinite in number and invisible because of their 
minutenesss.45 By moving in the void and combining, they generate 
every compound (Arist. GC I 8, 324b35-325a36> 67A7 DK> D30 
LM). The Aristotelian section of De generatione et corruptione 
which preserves the Democritean doctrine seems to be a direct 
response to Zeno’s arguments: it is composed of a first part (GC I 2, 
 
divisibility even for the ancients: motion is problematic not because of its 
indisputable physical reality, but because of its theoretical essence. 
45 For an interpretation of Atomism as a response to some challenging Eleatic 
questions see Curd, 1998, p. 215. 
 BETWEEN ELEATICS AND ATOMISTS 23 
 
316a14-b16) which is a faithful historical reconstruction of the 
Democritean thought, and a second one (316b16-34), called by David 
Sedley “neo-Democritean”, which can be interpreted as a fictitious 
speech, that is a speech that Democritus could have given in response 
to the objections no longer of Zeno, but of Aristotle himself46. 
The Democritean claim in favour of the existence of ultimate 
minimal magnitudes is introduced by Aristotle as a reductio ad 
absurdum which contains a clear formulation of the argument from 
divisibility: by conceding the assumptions of his detractors, 
Democritus would finally defend the indivisibility of atoms and argue 
against the division of being down to nothing. 
T2 
Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν πάντῃ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ σῶμα, διῃρήσθω. 
Τί οὖν ἔσται λοιπόν μέγεθος47; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε· ἔσται 
γάρ τι οὐ διῃρημένον, ἦν δὲ πάντῃ διαιρετόν. Ἀλλὰ 
μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἔσται σῶμα μηδὲ μέγεθος, διαίρεσις δ' 
ἔσται, ἢ ἐκ στιγμῶν ἔσται, καὶ ἀμεγέθη ἐξ ὧν 
σύγκειται, ἢ οὐδὲν παντάπασιν, ὥστε κἂν γίνοιτο ἐκ 
μηδενὸς κἂν εἴη συγκείμενον, καὶ τὸ πᾶν δὴ οὐδὲν 
ἄλλ' ἢ φαινόμενον. Ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν ᾖ ἐκ στιγμῶν, οὐκ 
ἔσται ποσόν. Ὁπότε γὰρ ἥπτοντο καὶ ἓν ἦν μέγεθος 
καὶ ἅμα ἦσαν, οὐδὲν ἐποίουν μεῖζον τὸ πᾶν. 
Διαιρεθέντος γὰρ εἰς δύο καὶ πλείω, οὐδὲν ἔλαττον 
οὐδὲ μεῖζον τὸ πᾶν τοῦ πρότερον, ὥστε κἂν πᾶσαι 
συντεθῶσιν, οὐδὲν ποιήσουσι μέγεθος. 
Since, therefore, the body is like this everywhere, let 
it have been divided. What magnitude will be left, 
then? There cannot be one, for then there will be 
something undivided, but it was said to be divisible 
everywhere. On the other 
hand, if there is going to be no body or magnitude left, 
but the division is going to exist, either the body will 
 
46 See Sedley, 2008, p. 317-20, for an accurate reconstruction of this argument, 
which shows a Democritean inspiration and faces some reasonable anti-Atomistic 
objections. 
47 I follow Sedley, 2008, p. 313, n. 27 (“I cannot see why the editors have preferred 
the scarcely natural punctuation τί οὖν ἔσται λοιπόν; μέγεθος”). 
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consist of points and its components be sizeless, or 
they will be nothing at all, with the consequence that 
it could come to be and be composed from nothing, 
and the whole thing would be a mere appearance. 
Similarly, even if it consists of points, there will be no 
quantity. For when the points were in contact and there 
was a single magnitude and they were together, 
they did not make the whole thing any bigger; for 
when the magnitude was divided into two or more, the 
whole was no smaller or bigger than before; hence 
even if they are all put together, they will produce no 
magnitude.  
(Arist. GC I 2, 316a23–34> 68A48b DK)48 
The Atomistic reply appears to be like a tautology: since divisibility 
in every part is impossible, then indivisible entities must exist.49 To 
get out of the impasse a distinction between physical and geometrical 
divisibility has been suggested: whereas atoms cannot be physically 
separated into smaller parts, they could not be protected against a 
theoretical and geometrical division.50 Thus, although their physical 
indivisibility is indisputable, this would not exclude the theoretical 
existence of parts. On the one hand, it is difficult to think that 
 
48 Translation by Sedley, 2008. Laks-Most (2016) select and translate only GC I 2, 
316a14-17> D41 LM: they consider the following arguments in favour of ultimate 
indivisibility as a reconstruction. 
49  We do not have any precise suggestion on how to interpret πάντῃ in the 
Democritean argument, but only in the “neo-Democritean” one: it would be not a 
simultaneous division everywhere, but a progressive bisection of a magnitude, like 
a Zenonian dichotomy, which could never become exhaustive. Therefore, for the 
Aristotelian Democritus of GC I 2, 316b17-34 division at every point cannot be 
accomplished both because of its paradoxical consequences and its conceptual 
impossibility. Division ends when it reaches its limits (atoms). 
50 Sedley sees, within the so called neo-Democritean argument, the first likely 
formulation of a “theoretical divisibility”, which Democritus could hardly contrast 
by mathematical means. Barnes, 1982 p. 276-85, especially p. 281, argues in favour 
of a physical indivisibility; Furley, 1967, I chap. 6, in favour of a mathematical 
one. Furthermore, by assuming that a distinction between physical and 
mathematical divisibility makes any sense in the fifth century B.C., according to 
Furley (1982, p. 370-1) the Eleatics would defend both indivisibilities, so that an 
Atomistic reply in favour of atoms only physically uncuttable would have been 
unconvincing. 
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Democritus limited himself to physical indivisibility and was 
therefore satisfied with such an incomplete response to Zeno’s 
puzzles from dichotomy. On the other, if the divisibility, as 
everywhere and simultaneously occurring, were purely mental or 
theoretical (as the insistence on the fact that “it is possible” would 
suggest, in 316a16 and 17), why would Democritus illustrate such a 
division with the example of the sawdust (GC 316a34-b2)?51 
For the sake of my argument, it seems reasonable to me to suppose 
that Democritus’ accusers used an argument traditionally rooted in 
physical divisibility, that is, the separation of a magnitude out into 
ever smaller parts. Democritus would have attacked Eleatics by 
exploring the paradoxical consequence of their argument from 
divisibility everywhere: for if what is is ex hypothesi divided or 
divisible at every point, the remaining parts will be either sizeless 
points or nothing at all. But if so, we should suppose that either the 
reassembled body will be without magnitude, or it will be nothing at 
all and be composed of nothing. Since both hypotheses are absurd, 
Democritus concludes that indivisible magnitudes, namely 
uncuttable bodies, must necessarily exist. 
An Eleatic version of the argument from divisibility, very similar to 
that introduced both in Gorgias (T1) and Democritus (T2), is 
preserved by Simplicius. 
T3 
ἕτερος δὲ ἦν λόγος τῷ Παρμενίδῃ ὁ διὰ τῆς διχοτομίας 
οἰόμενος δεικνύναι τὸ ὂν ἓν εἶναι μόνον καὶ τοῦτο 
ἀμερὲς καὶ ἀδιαίρετον. εἰ γὰρ εἴη, φησί, διαιρετόν, 
τετμήσθω δίχα, κἄπειτα τῶν μερῶν ἑκάτερον δίχα, καὶ 
τούτου ἀεὶ γενομένου δῆλόν φησιν, ὡς ἤτοι ὑπομενεῖ 
τινὰ ἔσχατα μεγέθη ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἄτομα, πλήθει δὲ 
ἄπειρα, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐξ ἐλαχίστων, πλήθει δὲ ἀπείρων 
συστήσεται· ἢ φροῦδον ἔσται καὶ εἰς οὐθὲν ἔτι 
διαλυθήσεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μηδενὸς συστήσεται· ἅπερ 
ἄτοπα. οὐκ ἄρα διαιρεθήσεται, ἀλλὰ μενεῖ ἕν. [140.1] 
 
51 As Sedley (2008, p. 313) suggests, “the entire Democritean argument will prove 
to be one about the actual decomposition – and not merely the analysis – into its 
ultimate constituents of magnitude that is ex hypothesi divisible throughout”. 
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καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἐπεὶ πάντῃ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν, εἴπερ διαιρετὸν 
ὑπάρχει, πάντῃ ὁμοίως ἔσται διαιρετόν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ 
μέν, τῇ δὲ οὔ. διῃρήσθω δὴ πάντῃ· δῆλον οὖν πάλιν 
ὡς οὐδὲν ὑπομενεῖ, ἀλλ' ἔσται φροῦδον, καὶ εἴπερ 
συστήσεται, πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ μηδενὸς συστήσεται. εἰ γὰρ 
ὑπομενεῖ τι, οὐδέ πω γενήσεται πάντῃ διῃρημένον. 
ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερόν φησιν, ὡς ἀδιαίρετόν τε 
καὶ ἀμερὲς καὶ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ὄν. 
[A] Parmenides had another argument, the one by 
means of dichotomy, which aims to show that being is 
only one and that it is without parts and indivisible. 
For if it were divisible, says <Parmenides>, it is 
divided into two parts and each of the two parts still in 
two parts, and always proceeding this division, it is 
clear, he says, that either they would remain of the last 
very small and indivisible quantities but unlimited in 
number, and the whole would be composed of very 
small parts, but unlimited in number; or <the being> 
would vanish and dissolve into nothingness, and 
would be composed of nothing, and that is absurd. 
Therefore, being will not be divisible but remains one. 
[140.1] [B] And indeed, since it [scil. the one] is in all 
respects the same, if it were divisible it would be 
equally divisible in everything, and not already here, 
and not there. But let’s say that being is divided in all 
respects; it is clear once again that nothing will remain, 
and it will disappear, and if it is composed, it will once 
again be composed of nothing. If in fact something 
remains, it will not have happened yet that it will be 
divided in all respects. So, even from this it is clear, 
<Parmenides> says, that being will be indivisible and 
with no parts and one. 
(Simpl. in Phys. 139.25-140.6> R65 LM) 
Porphyry explicitly attributes the argument from dichotomy to 
Parmenides. To my knowledge, only David Sedley does not exclude 
the possibility of a Parmenidean origin of this puzzle which is 
generally ascribed to Zeno.52 While the A argument appears to focus 
 
52 Sedley, 2008, p. 322. In favour of Zeno as inspirer of the argument see many 
ancient commentators, like Simplicius (in Phys. 140.21) and Philoponus (in Phys. 
80.23-81.7). See also Owen, 1975, p. 163 n. 10 and Makin, 1982, p. 231-3: 
according to Makin, the argument from divisibility is “consistent with any sensible 
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on the notion of infinite divisibility, advanced by Zeno in his claims 
against plurality (D5-6 LM), the B argument introduces a different 
idea of decomposition – that is, an exhaustive divisibility to the point 
of nothingness – and defends the unity of being by proposing an 
argument very similar to Parmenides 22B8 DK, vv. 22-24 (“nor is it 
divisible, since as a whole it is all alike, / nor at all more here […] / 
nor at all less”). According to the Eleatics (and the Atomists too), 
being is ungenerated, homogeneous and indivisible. Then, Porphyry 
suggests just three possibilities: 
a) being can be divided nowhere (that is, it is indivisible) 
b) it can be divided somewhere (e.g. here and not there) 
c) it can be divided everywhere. 
While the Eleatics obviously upheld the first option, the Atomists 
upheld the same about the atoms themselves, but not about the whole 
as composed by atoms and void. For, by considering the atoms which 
are full, homogeneous and without internal void, they agree with the 
Eleatics, whereas by considering the whole, which is an aggregate of 
atoms and void, they are forced to choose between (b) and (c). But, 
according to the homogeneity principle which the Atomists agree on, 
they must uphold (c), which is taken to be absurd. More precisely, if 
a body (namely a compound) is divisible in the portion corresponding 
to the void and the being is by definition homogeneous, that is 
everywhere identical to itself, then it must be everywhere divisible.53 
This claim, explicitly deriving from homogeneity, is suggested not 
only by Parmenides but also by Gorgias. In other words, it is likely 
that Gorgias (T1) drew on a topic inspired by Eleatics (whether 
 
account of the arguments against plurality given in the Zenonian B fragments” (p. 
231); moreover, the lack of explicit reference to homogeneity in Zeno would not 
be an evidence against it. Finally, according to Makin this type of argument seems 
out of style with Parmenides. 
53 By exploring Simplicius’ testimony about Zeno (in Phys. 139.7-19; 140.27-
141.8), Makin (1982, p. 225, n. 16), considers Zeno’s argument against plurality as 
grounded in the homogeneity, and consequent indivisibility of being. On the 
principle of homogeneity and its connection with divisibility at every point see also 
Warren, 2007, p. 161-2. 
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proposed by Parmenides or Zeno, T3), who introduce the puzzle from 
“πάντῃ divisibility” with an anti-pluralistic aim. Democritus (T2) 
would have responded to this argument by claiming the paradoxality 
of divisibility everywhere. The point of weakness in the Atomists’ 
reasoning must have been noticed by Gorgias: for, if an atom, insofar 
as it is homogeneous, cannot be divided at one point rather than 
another, it will be divided either at every point or, conversely, at no 
point. But the second conclusion is no more justified than the first 
one, so that the Sophist, taking up the Eleatic assumptions, would 
have attacked the Atomists’ ontology as inconsistent.54 
Gorgias’ version of the argument from 
divisibility and the role of the void 
Gorgias’ claim against motion is likely to refer to physical 
divisibility, as the presence of void suggests: if something is 
divisible, according to Atomists it is divisible only at some points, 
that is where the void stands between the atoms, while according to 
Gorgias it is divisible everywhere, once granted that being is by its 
nature homogeneous and all alike. But if something is divisible at 
every point, then at every point it is not. In order to make the 
argument from divisibility stronger, Gorgias adds the equivalence 
between being divided and void (i.e. not being) that the Anonymous 
explicitly attributes to the Sophist and which is not elsewhere 
preserved in the same way. 
Void, as a condition of motion, is crucial in the Eleatic and in the 
Atomistic doctrine. According to Melissus, what moves needs a void 
in which to withdraw, but since void, that is not being, does not exist, 
neither does motion: 
οὐδὲ κενεόν ἐστιν οὐδέν· τὸ γὰρ κενεὸν οὐδέν ἐστιν· 
οὐκ ἂν οὖν εἴη τό γε μηδέν. οὐδὲ κινεῖται· ὑποχωρῆσαι 
γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει οὐδαμῆι, ἀλλὰ πλέων ἐστίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ 
 
54 On the principle of sufficient reason and its application in this kind of reasoning 
see De Lacy, 1972 and Bredlow, 2016, p. LV-LVI. 
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κενεὸν ἦν, ὑπεχώρει ἂν εἰς τὸ κενόν· κενοῦ δὲ μὴ 
ἐόντος οὐκ ἔχει ὅκηι ὑποχωρήσει. 
And there is not any void. For the void is nothing. But 
what is nothing could not exist. Nor does it move. For 
it has nowhere it can recede to, but it is full; for if there 
were void, it would recede toward the void; but since 
the void does not exist, it has nowhere to recede to. 
(Simpl. in Phys. 112.6-112.10> 30B7[7] DK> D10 
LM)  
By considering this fragment, some scholars have interpreted void 
not as an empty space outside the bodies, but as a “negative 
substance” inside the bodies themselves, mixed with them to make 
them less than totally dense. Thus, Melissus would have denied “an 
internal admixture of void, which would make what exists rare or 
spongy and thus enable it to ‘give way’ (ὑποχωρεῖν) at some point.” 55 
By denying the existence of the void as an internal component of 
bodies, movement conceived of as dependent on density/rarity would 
therefore also be excluded. Indeed, a body without void, therefore 
entirely dense and full, is immobile. This interpretation cannot be 
discussed in detail here. In any case, it does not seem decisive for my 
argument to establish whether the void is conceived as an empty 
space or as a space occupier, although the hypothesis of void as a 
negative substance is well suited to my reading: what is certain is that 
the Eleatic being, completely full, immobile and continuous, is 
incompatible with any idea of void. 
Melissus introduces, on the one hand, the notion of void as a 
precondition of motion and, on the other, the equivalence between 
“void” and “nothing”, two intuitions taken up and then developed by 
 
55 See Sedley, 1982, p. 178: for the Atomists (and, in any case, up to the fourth 
century BC) what exists occupies or fills a space; therefore, both atoms and void 
(understood as a more or less wide gap between the atoms themselves) are space-
occupiers. It is likely that the Atomists did not have a notion of space as such: what 
is certain is that the void is the space unoccupied by atoms, that is, the necessary 
condition for their movement. For a different reading cf. Malcolm, 1991, p. 94 note 
43. 
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Leucippus and the Atomists with an anti-Eleatic purpose 56 . It is 
likely, as the Anonymous suggests, that Leucippus responded 
precisely to this line of argument: for, even admitting that the 
mention of his name (MXG 980a7) is an introduction of the 
Anonymous himself, it should be considered as a recognizable 
reference to the contrast between Eleatics and Atomists on 
multiplicity and motion. Thus, the expression kaloumenoi logoi in 
MXG appears to confirm that Leucippus advanced his arguments as 
a reply to the Eleatic objections: the kaloumenoi of the Anonymous 
would precisely recall those specific arguments (logoi, in GC I 8, 
325a23) attributed to Leucippus by Aristotle.57 
Λεύκιππος δ' ἔχειν ᾠήθη λόγους οἵ τινες πρὸς τὴν 
αἴσθησιν ὁμολογούμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναιρήσουσιν 
οὔτε γένεσιν οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος 
τῶν ὄντων. Ὁμολογήσας δὲ ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς 
φαινομένοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἓν κατασκευάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ 
ἂν κίνησιν οὖσαν ἄνευ κενοῦ τό τε κενὸν μὴ ὄν, καὶ 
τοῦ ὄντος οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν φησιν εἶναι. Τὸ γὰρ κυρίως ὂν 
παμπλῆρες ὄν· ἀλλ' εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλ' 
ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἀόρατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν 
ὄγκων. Ταῦτα δ' ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι (κενὸν γὰρ 
εἶναι), καὶ συνιστάμενα μὲν γένεσιν ποιεῖν, 
διαλυόμενα δὲ φθοράν. 
But Leucippus thought he possessed assertions that, in 
agreement with sensation, would not abolish either 
generation or destruction or motion and the 
multiplicity of the things that are. Having thus granted 
these points to appearance and also to the defenders of 
the one, that there could not be motion without a void, 
that the void is what is not58, and that nothing that is 
not belongs to being, ha says that what is in the proper 
sense is being that is completely full, but that such a 
being is not one, but that they are unlimited in number 
and invisible because of the smallness of their masses. 
These are borne along in the void (because the void 
 
56 On the void as Melissus’ invention see Barnes, 1982, p. 217-18; Kirk-Raven-
Schofield, 1983, p. 408, n. 2; McKirahan, 2010, p. 300. 
57 On the presence of logoi as a linguistic tell-tale sign see Alfieri, 1936, p. 15, n. 
60; Newiger, 1973, p. 119ff.; Buchheim, 1989, p. 185 n. 13. 
58 Laks-Most translate “does not exist”. 
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exists) and when they gather together, they produce 
generation, and when they are dissociated, destruction.  
(Arist. GC I 8, 325a23-32> 67A7 DK> D30 LM, 
transl. Laks-Most, adapted) 
It is reasonable to assume that the Anonymous was well aware of this 
section of the Aristotelian work where Leucippus’ logoi are 
mentioned as claiming the existence of birth, death, multiplicity, 
motion; the Atomist is said to explicitly agree on three Eleatic 
assumptions: (1) motion implies void; (2) void is what is not; (3) 
nothing of what is not belongs to being. Before citing the logoi of 
Leucippus, Aristotle introduces arguments coming from an anti-
pluralistic context, probably Eleatic, which prepares the ground for 
the subsequent refutation. 
Ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἔδοξε τὸ ὂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἓν 
εἶναι καὶ ἀκίνητον· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κενὸν οὐκ ὄν, 
κινηθῆναι δ’ οὐκ ἂν δύνασθαι μὴ ὄντος κενοῦ 
κεχωρισμένου, oὐδ’ αὖ πολλὰ εἶναι μὴ ὄντος τοῦ 
διείργοντος. τοῦτο δὲ μηδὲν διαφέρειν, εἴ τις οἴεται μὴ 
συνεχὲς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν ἀλλ’ ἅπτεσθαι διῃρημένον, τοῦ 
φάναι πολλὰ καὶ μὴ ἓν εἶναι καὶ κενόν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ 
πάντῃ διαιρετόν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἕν, ὥστε οὐδὲ πολλά, 
ἀλλὰ κενὸν τὸ ὅλον· εἰ δὲ τῇ μὲν τῇ δὲ μή, 
πεπλασμένῳ τινὶ τοῦτ’ ἐοικέναι·  
[A] Some of the ancients thought that what is must 
necessarily be one and immobile; for the void is 
something that does not exist, and what is could not 
move if there is no separate void, nor could many 
things exist, if there is not something that separates 
them; [B] and if one thinks that the whole is not 
continuous but, being divided, [scil. its parts] are in 
contact, this is not at all different from saying that 
many things exist and not only one, and that the void 
exists. For if it is divisible everywhere, there is nothing 
that is one, so that they are not many either, but all is 
void; but if it is [scil. divisible] here but not there, this 
seems to be like a fiction. 
(Arist. GC I 8, 325a2-11> A8 DK> D12b LM) 
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I divided the text into two sub-arguments, respectively introduced by 
the plural pronoun ἔνιοι and by the indefinite singular τις. According 
to the ἔνιοι in argument A (GC 325a2-6), multiplicity and motion 
imply the existence of void, since a separation should necessarily 
occur between the elements that make up the many and that can move 
only through the void. Indeed, the existence of a multiplicity would 
be impossible without an intermediate void. Argument B (CG 325a6-
11) introduces a new element: even if we suppose a divisibility in 
contact, namely a divisibility of the whole into adherent parts, we 
should still conclude that the whole is not one but many. And finally, 
if a complete division of the whole is granted ex hypothesi, we should 
still admit the presence of an element which can separate the being 
everywhere, and such an element must be the void, that is, not 
being.59 
Although the overall argument in GC 325a2-11 is not attributed to 
any particular philosopher, we can recognize Eleatic claims behind 
this section of the Aristotelian text, and specifically Zenonian in 
reference to divisibility, and Melissean regarding to the equivalence 
between void and nothing. In my opinion, however, the co-presence 
of these two themes excludes the possibility that the author of the 
whole argument is exclusively one or the other philosopher.60 As 
seen above, in Melissus we find a well-developed argument against 
motion which is based on assumptions different from Zeno’s. For, at 
least as far as we know, Zeno would refute motion not starting from 
the unity of being, as Melissus does, but considering the aporias 
related to the existence of the place in which to move (as in D17 LM, 
 
59 Cf. in this regard also Philoponus: “When Democritus said that the atoms are in 
contact with each other, he did not mean contact, strictly speaking, which occurs 
when the surfaces of the things in contact fit perfectly with one another, but the 
condition in which the atoms are near one another and not far apart is what he called 
contact. For no matter what, they are separated by void” (Philop., Commentary on 
Aristotle’s GC 158.27-159.3> DK 67A7). Cf. 68A64 DK. 
60 On this point I agree with Bremond, 2017, p. 42-3. 
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on which see p. 4). Finally, neither do we have Zenonian arguments 
about void nor any reason to believe that he denied its existence.61 
Wondering about the identity of the ἔνιοι, many scholars favour the 
hypothesis of an argument created ad hoc by Aristotle to describe the 
Eleatic being and to anticipate the Atomistic counterargument 
according to a methodology elsewhere adopted in his Metaphysics.62 
It is difficult to believe that Aristotle introduces a specific topic by 
Melissus, and then extends it to Eleatic thought as a whole: therefore 
he would have created an Eleatic argument by selecting Melissean 
and Zenonian claims, and this, as well as being perfectly compatible 
with his argumentative strategy, would also be confirmed by the fact 
that this passage works as a historical introduction to Atomism. The 
Atomists in fact resume the Eleatic premises but, accepting the 
existence of the void, they aim to explain phenomena such as motion 
and multiplicity.63 According to this hypothesis it would therefore 
have been important for Aristotle to highlight both the Eleatic 
argument from divisibility, replied to by the Atomistic doctrine of 
indivisible atoms, and the argument of the void, whose existence is 
denied by Melissus as not being. However, the relevance of argument 
B, which connects the topic of divisibility everywhere with that of 
void, ending up denying the one and the many at the same time, 
brings us to a very particular strategy that combines pre-existing 
arguments, diverting them towards a ‘nihilist’ goal. This strategy, 
albeit in an overcondensed form, is perfectly in accord with the 
Gorgianic reflection upon motion as preserved in T1 (MXG 980a3-
8). 
I would therefore suggest that the argument B, starting right from the 
indefinite τις, echoes a specific topic of Gorgias which Aristotle must 
 
61 Furthermore, even by assuming that the denial of void aims to deny multiplicity, 
we must remember that Zeno has other more famous arguments against the many. 
62 Barnes (1982, p.159) speaks of an “Aristotelian potpourri”: this hypothesis is 
essentially agreed on by Bremond, 2017, p. 44ff. The Leucippean origin of this 
reflection as proposed by Bollack (1969, p. 35) has been rejected with convincing 
arguments by De Ley, 1972. 
63 Cf. Rashed, 2005, p. 139ff. 
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have been familiar with: the MXG text, full of Eleatic and Atomistic 
suggestions, is not only linguistically very similar to GC I 8, 325a8-
11, but also referred both to divisibility everywhere and void. These 
elements were probably reworked by Gorgias himself, aware of the 
aporias involved in the doctrine of Atomism. Let us consider that the 
assumption of numerically unlimited atoms could easily legitimize 
an objection based on infinite divisibility; moreover, a dialectician 
such as Gorgias would have certainly regarded with suspicion the 
distinction between “what is being in the proper sense” (τὸ [...] 
κυρίως ὂν, GC I 8, 325a29) and what is being not in the proper sense. 
This theoretical ambiguity must have been the fertile ground for the 
Sophistic claim aimed at revealing the shift between the existential 
and copulative meaning of the verb εἶναι, exactly as in the idios 
apodeixis. Finally, the B argument in GC ends up denying not just 
either the many or the one, but both (GC 325a8-9), and that is a 
remarkable conclusion shared with Gorgias (MXG 980a5-6). 
It could be argued that it is a dialectical move by the Eleatics, who 
refute the one in order to deny the multiplicity which is composed by 
units (as in Zeno’s puzzles, whether or not he was aware of the 
aporia). Nevertheless, the reasoning is aimed at showing that, once 
divisibility (and therefore void) is admitted, the first element to be 
dismissed is the one, and only consequently the many.64 Moreover, 
the reference to Leucippus’ kaloumenoi logoi in MXG encourages us 
to assume that the Anonymous was very familiar with this passage of 
the Aristotelian text where Eleatic and Atomistic arguments are 
intertwined with their polemic echo in Gorgias. 
Here as elsewhere Aristotle is probably borrowing some suggestions 
from PTMO, but he avoids making Gorgias’ name explicit.65 Many 
 
64 Furley distinguishes the divisibility argument inspired by Zeno from that which, 
considering the void, concludes that everything is empty, and therefore nothing is. 
This last conclusion, as Furley himself admits, “has not been advanced, as far as I 
know, anywhere else” (Furley, 1982, p. 364). My suggestion is that this specific 
argument should be attributed to Gorgias. 
65 I addressed the problem in Ioli, 2007. Further example of a Gorgianic echo could 
be the dilemma on generation as birth either from what is or what is not (Phys. I 8 
191a27-31). In this regard see also Bremond, 2017, p. 47: the argument could be 
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echoes from Gorgias could be mentioned: let us here introduce just a 
passage from De sensu where, behind the anonymous τινες, we may 
reasonably recognise an argument from the third thesis of PTMO, as 
seems to be confirmed both by linguistic and argumentative 
analogies.66 According to Aristotle the origin of a sensation is one 
and the same, although consequent motions and perceptions are many 
and different. In such a way he responds to the aporias raised by the 
supporters of the so-called intersubjective argument, first of all 
Gorgias, who maintains that it is impossible for two persons to share 
the same perception. For a single thing, whether a perception or a 
thought, cannot physically and simultaneously be found in two 
different and separate subjects, for example in a speaker and a 
listener, since the one would be two. This specific element of the 
theory of perception, rooted in the doctrine of haporroai, is due 
precisely to the Sophist. An implicit reference to Gorgias and his 
theory of perception is recognizable also at the beginning of GC I 8, 
where the generic reference to the Empedoclean theory of poroi must 
certainly include the Sophist among his supporters. This can be 
confirmed by the numerous analogies between that Aristotelian 
passage (GC I 8, 324b26-29> 31A87 DK> D210 LM) and the third 
thesis of PTMO in the two versions (MXG 980a20-b7 and S.E. M. 
7.83-86). 67  Therefore, we should not be surprised that some 
Gorgianic arguments are traced in Aristotle: the target of the Sophist, 
who must have been very familiar with Melissus’ arguments and their 
 
considered as the Aristotelian reformulation of an ancient debate on the generation, 
preserved in Gorgias too (MXG 979b27-33 and S.E., M. 7.71, supra p. 5). 
66 Arist. Sens. 6, 446b18-21 ἀδύνατον γάρ φασί τινες ἄλλον ἄλλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούειν 
καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ' εἶναι πολλοὺς καὶ χωρὶς ὄντας <ἓν> 
ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἓν χωρὶς ἂν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ εἶναι (“for they argue 
that it is impossible for several separate persons to hear or smell the same thing; 
for in that case a single thing would be separate from itself”, transl. Hett 1957). Cf. 
MXG 980b9-11 ἀλλὰ πῶς ὁ ἀκούων τὸ αὐτὸ ἐννοήσει; οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα 
ἐν πλείοσι καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν εἶναι· δύο γὰρ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἕν (“then how will someone 
who hears understand the same thing? For it is not possible that the same be at the 
same time in multiple things that are separately, for one would be two”). See also 
Gorg. Pal. 35. 
67 Cf. also Pl. Men. 76c4-e4> 82B4 DK> D45a LM, and Theoph. Ign. 73> 82B5 
DK> D45b LM. 
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polemic reply in Leucippus, was reasonably not only Eleatism, but 
also Atomism. Since being is found to be neither one nor many, 
Gorgias can conclude that nothing is. 
An argument against motion such as that preserved in MXG does 
obviously target the Atomists who defend motion: they argue for the 
existence of a ‘residual’ outcome in a process of divisibility, that is 
very small and indivisible bodies which move in the void and can 
generate the whole reality, thanks to their movement. Thus, in his 
synthetic proof Gorgias uses Eleatic arguments against multiplicity 
and motion, by mixing them together for a purpose which is jointly 
anti-pluralistic and anti-monistic. 
Conclusive remarks 
By exploring the structure of PTMO and, above all, its first thesis, it 
can be concluded that the argument against motion perfectly fits 
within the synthetike apodeixis and the dispute between Eleatics and 
Atomists which inspired this whole section of Gorgias’ treatise. It is 
not necessary to suppose a lost argument about rest: in the 
philosophical background in which Gorgias is included too,68  the 
discussion about unity and multiplicity is strictly connected with the 
problem of motion. 
We can therefore defend the reliability of the Anonymous regarding 
the general structure of the first thesis and, specifically, its argument 
against motion. Furthermore, the conciseness of the Anonymous 
style suggests that, even if some interference is not excluded, it is 
recognisable in brachylogical passages and not arbitrary additions. 
Conversely, Sextus does not refrain from making cuts and edits, as it 
is evident in the third thesis where he omits both the inter- and the 
intra-subjective argument (MXG 980b8-19). 
In the doxographical passage which prefaces the PTMO first thesis, 
the method attributed to Gorgias by the Anonymous involves a 
 
68 Cf. Isocr. Antid. 15.268 (82B1a DK> R24a LM) and Hel. 3 (82B1b DK> R24b 
LM). 
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synthesis (MXG 979a14 συνθεὶς τὰ ἑτέροις εἰρημένα), that is, a well-
aimed assembly of the doctrines of others, whose mutual contrast 
corroborates his thesis that nothing is. His conclusion is therefore 
supported by a dialectical use of the arguments of Eleatics and 
Atomists. In this context, his claim against motion must be 
understood as an argument well-grounded in the debate about 
one/many. The Atomists respond to the puzzles from dichotomy and 
regressus ad infinitum which undermine plurality, by introducing the 
multiplicity of indivisible atoms, capable of composing everything 
by joining in complex aggregates. Atomic compounds must be 
formed not only by being (i.e. homogenous and indivisible atoms), 
but also by not-being (i.e. void). This latter is necessary for both the 
separation between atoms and motion. But if being is composed of 
nothing – that negative substance which is void – then being itself is 
nothing. 
It is strange that none of the ancient commentators mentioned the 
argument from divisibility, preserved in Democritus and Gorgias, as 
a plausible response to the well-known Zenonian dichotomy or to 
some generally Eleatic claim against plurality. I believe that Gorgias’ 
argument against motion (T1) is a specific formulation of the 
argument from divisibility: by comparing this section of MXG with 
T2 (Democritus in GC 316a23-34) and T3 (Parmenides or some other 
Eleatic thinker in Simpl. in Phys.140.1-6)69 we can shed new light on 
the ancient debate about being. Two elements are preserved in all the 
texts, precisely the puzzle of divisibility everywhere (πάντῃ) and the 
lack of a λοιπόν, a rest once the division is occurred. However, only 
Gorgias makes explicit the equivalence between void and divisibility 
which ends up proving not just that the motion does not exist, but also 
– and above all – that nothing exists. 
In conclusion, my suggestion is that Gorgias’ argument against 
motion is part of a broader dispute on the divisibility/indivisibility of 
being, which has probably Parmenides as forebear (22B8 DK). On 
 
69 For the similarity between our passage in Simplicius and GC 316a see also Curd, 
1998, p. 186, n. 15. 
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the one hand, Gorgias would be confronted with the Eleatic 
(Parmenidean or Zenonian) version of the argument from divisibility 
as preserved in Simplicius. According to this anti-pluralistic claim, 
once the homogeneity of being is admitted, together with its 
divisibility, it will inevitably involve a complete divisibility, so that 
nothing will remain. Moreover, the whole (finally recomposed after 
the decomposition) will be composed of nothing, but this is absurd. 
Therefore, there is only the one, which is without parts. On the other 
hand, Gorgias must have faced a Democritean version of the 
argument from divisibility everywhere, that is, the Atomistic 
response to this puzzle, whose paradoxicality is contrasted by 
defending the plurality of indivisible atoms. 
Within this quarrel, Gorgias elaborates a particular version of the 
argument that clearly targets Eleatics as well as Atomists. If it is true, 
as I suppose, that Gorgias is the source of GC I 8, 325a6-11, we can 
suggest that Aristotle was well aware of the Sophistic reinterpretation 
of the puzzle which Gorgias diverted toward a ‘nihilistic’ conclusion. 
For Gorgias’ final aim is to show the contradictions inherent in 
monism as well as in pluralism. However naive and provocative his 
argument may turn out to be, it seems to me perfectly understandable 
within the controversy between Eleatics and Atomists, and coherent 
with the argumentative style of the Sophist, who likes collecting the 
doxai of others, showing inconsistencies and aporias not only (or not 
so much) in themselves, but above all in comparison with the 
opinions of others. In Gorgias’ PTMO, Zeno’s arguments are 
employed against Melissus and, even more skilfully, the Eleatic 
premises accepted by the Atomists end up refuting both in one fell 
swoop. 
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